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Abstract. Nowadays, privacy preserving machine learning has been
drawing much attention in both industry and academy. Meanwhile,
recommender systems have been extensively adopted by many com-
mercial platforms (e.g. Amazon) and they are mainly built based
on user-item interactions. Besides, social platforms (e.g. Facebook)
have rich resources of user social information. It is well known that
social information, which is rich on social platforms such as Face-
book, are useful to build intelligent recommender systems. It is an-
ticipated to combine the social information with the user-item rat-
ings to improve the overall recommendation performance. Most ex-
isting recommendation models are built based on the assumptions
that the social information are available. However, different plat-
forms are usually reluctant to (or can not) share their data due to
certain concerns. In this paper, we first propose a SEcure SOcial
RECommendation (SeSoRec) framework which is able to (1) col-
laboratively mine knowledge from social platform to improve the
recommendation performance of the rating platform, and (2) se-
curely keep the raw data of both platforms. We then propose a
Secret Sharing based Matrix Multiplication (SSMM) protocol to op-
timize SeSoRec and prove its correctness and security theoreti-
cally. By applying minibatch gradient descent, SeSoRec has linear
time complexities in terms of both computation and communication.
The comprehensive experimental results on three real-world datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed SeSoRec and SSMM.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, recommender systems have been extensively used in
many commercial platforms [3]. The key point for recommendation
is to use as much information as possible to learn better preferences
of users and items. To achieve this, besides user-item interaction
information, additional information such as social relationship and
contextual information have been utilized [19, 29, 2].
Existing researchers usually make the assumption that all kinds of
information are available, which is somehow inconsistent with most
of the real-world cases. In practice, different kinds of information are
located on different platforms, e.g., huge user-item interaction infor-
mation on Amazon while rich user social information on Facebook.
However, different platforms are reluctant to (or can not) share their
own data due to competition or regulation reasons.
Therefore, for the recommendation platforms who have rich user-
item interaction data, how to use the additional data such as social
information on other platforms to further improve recommendation
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performance, meanwhile protect the raw data security of both plat-
forms, is a crucial question to be answered. It is worthwhile to study
such a research topic in both industry and academia.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) provides a solution to the
above question. MPC aims to jointly compute a function for multi-
parties while keeping the individual inputs private [35], and it has
been adopted by many machine learning algorithms for secure data
mining, including decision tree [17], linear regression [27], and lo-
gistic regression [25]. However, it has not been applied to the above-
mentioned secure multi-party recommendation problems yet.
In this paper, we consider the scenarios where user-item interac-
tion information and user social information are on different plat-
forms, which is quite common in practice. Platform A has user-item
interaction information and Platform B has user social information,
the challenge is to improve the recommendation performance of A
by securely using the user social information on B. To fulfill this,
we formalize secure social recommendation as a MPC problem and
propose a SEcure SOcial RECommendation (SeSoRec) framework
for it. Our proposed SeSoRec is able to (1) collaboratively mine
knowledge from social platform to improve the recommendation per-
formance of the rating platform, and (2) keep the raw data of both
platforms securely. We further propose a novel Secret Sharing based
Matrix Multiplication (SSMM) protocol to optimize SeSoRec, and
we also prove its correctness and security. Our proposed SeSoRec
and SSMM have linear computation and communication complexities.
Experimental results conducted on three real-world datasets demon-
strate the effectiveness of our proposed SeSoRec and SSMM.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We observe a secure social recommendation problem in practice,
formalize it as a MPC problem, and propose a SeSoRec frame-
work for it.
• We propose a novel Secret Sharing based Matrix Multiplication
(SSMM) protocol to optimize SeSoRec, and we also prove its cor-
rectness and security.
• Our proposed SeSoRec and SSMM have linear computation and
communication complexities.
• Experimental results conducted on three real-world datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness of SeSoRec and SSMM.
2 Background
In this section, we review related backgrounds, including (1) social
recommendation, (2) secure multi-party computation, and (3) privacy
preserving recommendation.
2.1 Social Recommendation
Factorization based recommendation [24, 16, 3, 2] is one of the most
popular approaches in recommender system. It factorizes a user-
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item rating (or other interaction) matrix into a user latent matrix
and an item latent matrix. However, traditional factorization based
approaches assume that users are independent and identically dis-
tributed, which is inconsistent with the reality that users are inher-
ently connected via various types of social relations such as friend-
ships and trust relations. Therefore, social factorization models in-
corporate social relationship into account to improve recommenda-
tion performance [19], and the basic intuition is that connected users
are likely to have similar preferences. According to [32], social fac-
torization models can be formally stated as:
social factorization model = basic factorization model + social infor-
mation model.
To date, different social information models were proposed to cap-
ture social information, and the basic intuition is that connected users
are likely to have similar preferences.
2.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation
The concept of secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) was formally
introduced in [34], which aims to generate methods (or protocols)
for multi-parties to jointly compute a function (e.g., vector multipli-
cation) over their inputs (e.g., vectors for each party) while keeping
those inputs private. MPC can be implemented using different pro-
tocols, such as garbled circuits [35], GMW [10], and secret sharing
[30]. MPC has been applied into many machine learning algorithms,
such as decision tree [17], linear regression [27], logistic regression
[25], and collaborative filtering [31]. In this paper, we propose a se-
cret sharing based matrix muliplication algorithm for secure social
recommendation.
2.3 User Privacy Preserving Recommendation
Another related research area belongs to privacy preserving recom-
mendation. Recently, user privacy has drawn lots of attention, and
how to train models while keeping user privacy becomes a hot re-
search topic, e.g., federated learning and shared machine learning
[21, 4]. There are research works adopt garbled circuits to protect
user privacy while making recommendation [26]. Some other works
use differential privacy to protect user privacy while training recom-
mendation models [22, 14, 23].
Difference between user privacy and data security. User privacy
preserving recommendation aims to protect user privacy on the cus-
tomer side (2C), while data security based recommendation intends
to protect the data security of business partners who have already col-
lected users’ private data (2B). In this paper, we aim to (1) integrate
rating platform and social platform for better recommendation, and
(2) protect the data security of both platforms.
3 The Proposed Model
In this section, we first formally describe the secure social recom-
mendation problem, and then present our proposed SEcure SOcial
RECommendation (SeSoRec) framework for this problem.
3.1 Problem Definition
Formally, letA be the user-item interaction platform, and U and V be
the user and item set on it, with I and J denoting user size and item
size, respectively. Let R be user-item interaction set between user
i ∈ U and item j ∈ V , |R| is the total number of ratings. Let R be the
user-item interaction matrix, with element rij being the rating of user
i on item j. Let U ∈ RK×I and V ∈ RK×J denote the user and item
latent factor matrices, with their column vectors ui and vj being the
K-dimensional latent factors for user i and item j, respectively. Let
B be the user social platform, and we assume that the social platform
B has the same user set U as the user-item interaction platform A.
We further let S be the user-user social matrix7 , with the element sif
being the social relationship strength between user i and user f .
The problem of secure social recommendation is that, platforms
A and B securely keep their own data and model, meanwhile A can
improve its recommendation performance by utilizing the social in-
formation of B.
3.2 Secure Social Recommendation Framework
Social recommendation can be formalized as a basic factorization
model plus a social information model, based on the assumption that
connected users tend to have similar preferences, as described in Sec-
tion 2.1. Most existing social factorization models have the following
objective function
min
ui,vj
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
f(rij , ui, vj) + γ
I∑
i=1
I∑
f=1
g(sif , ui, uf), (1)
where f(rij , ui, vj) is the loss of the basic factorization model that
restricts the relationship between the true ratings and predicted rat-
ings, g(sif , ui, uf) is the loss of the social information model that
restricts the preferences of users who have social relations, and γ
controls the social restriction strength. A classical example is the So-
cial Regularizer recommendation (Soreg) approach [19], where
f(rij , ui, vj) =
1
2
Iij
(
rij − uiT vj
)2
, (2)
g(sif , ui, uf) =
1
2
sif ||ui − uf||2F , (3)
where Iij is the indicator function that equals to 1 if there is an ex-
isting user-item interaction pair and 0 otherwise, and || · ||2F is the
Frobenius norm.
Traditional social recommendation frameworks such as Soreg can
be efficiently solved by stochastic Gradient Descent (GD). However,
the social information model in Equation (3) involves a real num-
ber sif which belongs to the social platform B, and two real-valued
vectors ui and uf which are located on the rating platform A, secure
computation are not guaranteed due to the breach that A can easily
deduce the values sif belonging to B.
To solve this problem, we propose to use minibatch GD instead
of stochastic GD. We use B to denote the user-item rating set in
the current minibatch and |B| is the batch size. Let UB and VB be
the user set and item set in the current batch, |UB| and |VB| be the
user and item size. Apparently |UB| ≤ |B| and |VB| ≤ |B|. We use
RB ∈ R|UB|×|VB| to denote the rating matrix in the current batch,
IB ∈ R|UB|×|VB| to denote the indicator matrix in the current batch.
Let UB ∈ RK×|UB| and VB ∈ RK×|VB| be the latent factors of the
corresponding users and items in the current minibatch. Equation (1)
becomes
min
UB,VB
L = 1
2
||IB ◦
(
RB − UTB VB
)
||2F
+
γ
2
SUM
(
DB ◦ (UTB UB)
)
− γSUM
(
SB ◦ (UTB U)
)
+
γ
2
SUM
(
E ◦ (UTU)
)
+
λ
2
(||UB||2F + ||VB||2F ) ,
(4)
7 Note that our model can be slightly modifed to meet the case when S is
asymmetric.
Algorithm 1: Secure social recommendation
Input: The observed rating matrix (R) on platform A, user
social matrix (S) on platform B, regularization
strength(γ, λ), learning rate (θ), and maximum iterations
(T )
Output: user latent matrix (U) and item latent matrix (V) on
platform A
1 Platform A initializes U and V
2 for t = 1 to T do
3 A and B calculate DTU and STU based on the secure
matrix multiplication in Algorithm 2
4 A locally calculates ∂L
∂U based on Equation (5)
5 A locally calculates ∂L
∂V based on Equation (6)
6 A locally updates U by U← U− θ ∂L
∂U
7 A locally updates V by V← V− θ ∂L
∂V
8 end
9 return U and V on A
where DB ∈ R|UB|×|UB| is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element
db =
∑I
f=1 sbf , SB ∈ R|UB|×I is the social matrix of the users
in current minibatch, and E ∈ RI×I is also a diagonal matrix with
diagonal element ei =
∑|UB|
b=1 sbi. The gradients of L in Equation (4)
with respect to UB and VB are
∂L
∂UB
= −VB
((
RB − UTB VB
)T
◦ IB
)
+
γ
2
UBDTB
− γUSTB + γ
2
UBETB + λUB
(5)
∂L
∂VB
= −UB
((
RB − UTB VB
)T
◦ IB
)
+ λVB, (6)
where EB ∈ R|UB|×|UB| is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element
eb = ei|i=b which is get by extracting the corresponding users’ di-
agonal elements from E in current batch.
We observe in Equations (5) and (6) that the matrix product terms
UBDTB , USTB , and UBETB are crucial. These terms involve one matrix
(U or UB) on the rating platform and another matrix (DB, SB, or EB)
on the social platform. All the other terms can be calculated locally
by the rating platform. Therefore, we conclude that the key to secure
social recommendation is the secure matrix multiplication operation,
which is a secure MPC problem. We summarize the proposed SEcure
SOcial RECommendation (SeSoRec) solution in Algorithm 1, and
will present how to perform secure matrix multiplication in the next
section.
4 Secret Sharing based Matrix Multiplication
In this section, we first describe technical preliminaries, and then
present a secure matrix multiplication protocol, followed by its cor-
rectness and security proof.
4.1 Preliminaries
Secret Sharing. Our proposal relies on Additive Sharing. We briefly
review this but refer the reader to [7] for more details. To additively
share (Shr(·)) an `-bit value x for two parties (A and B), party A
generates xB ∈ Z2` uniformly at random, sends xB to to party B,
and keeps xA = (x − xB) mod 2`. We use 〈x〉i to denote the share
of party i. To reconstruct (Rec(·, ·)) an additively shared value 〈x〉,
each party i sends 〈x〉i to one who computes ∑i xi mod 2`, i ∈
{A,B}. In this paper, we denote additive sharing by 〈·〉.
Apply to decimal numbers. The above protocol can not work directly
with decimal numbers, since it is not possible to sample uniformly
in R [5]. Following the existing work [25], we approximate deci-
mal arithmetics by using fixed-point arithmetics. First, fixed-point
addition is trivial. Second, for fixed-point multiplication, we use the
following strategy. Suppose a and b are two decimal numbers with at
most lF bits in the fractional part, we first transform them to integers
by letting a′ = 2lF a and b′ = 2lF b, and then calculate z = a′b′.
Finally, the last lF bits of z are truncated so that it has at most lF bits
representing the fractional part. The correctness of the above trunca-
tion technique for secret sharing can be found in [25].
Simulation-based Security Proof. To formally prove that a proto-
col is secure, we adopt the semi-honest point of view [9], where each
participant truthfully obeys the protocol while being curious about
the other parties’ original data. Under the real world and ideal world
simulation-based proof [18], whatever can be computed by one party
can be simulated given only the messages it receives during the pro-
tocol, which implies that each party learns nothing from the protocol
execution beyond what they can derive from messages received in
the protocol. To formalize our security proof, we need the following
notations:
• We use f(x1, x2) to denote a function with two variables, where
x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n could be encodings of any mathematical objects,
e.g. integers, vectors, matrices, or even functionals. We also use pi
to denote a two-party protocol for computing f .
• The view of the i-th party (i ∈ {A, B}) during the execution
of pi is denoted as viewpii (x1, x2, n) which can be expanded as
(xi, ri,mi), where xi is the input of i-th party, ri is its internal
random bits, and mi is the messages received or derived by the
i-th party during the execution of pi. Note that mi includes all the
intermediate messages received, all information derived from the
intermediate messages, and also the output of i-th party during the
protocol.
• A probability ensemble X = {X(a, n)}a∈{0,1}∗;n∈N is an infi-
nite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
n ∈ N. In the context of secure multiparty computation, a repre-
sents each party’s input and n represents problem size.
Definition 1 Two probability ensembles P =
{P (a, n)}a∈{0,1}∗;n∈N and Q = {Q(a, n)}a∈{0,1}∗;n∈N are
said to be computatitionally indistinguishable, denoted by P
c≡ Q, if
for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D and every poly-
nomial p(·), there exists an N ∈ N such that for every a ∈ {0, 1}∗
and every n ∈ N,
|Pr{D(P (a, n)) = 1} − Pr{D(Q(a, n)) = 1}| ≤ 1
p(n)
.
Definition 2 Let f(x1, x2) be a function. We say a two-party pro-
tocol pi computes f with information leakage v1 to party A and v2
to party B where each party is viewed as semi-honest adversaries, if
there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms S1 and S2 such
that
{(S1(1n, x1, v1(x1, x2)))}x1,x2,n
c≡ {(viewpi1 (x1, x2, n))},
{(S2(1n, x1, v2(x1, x2)))}x1,x2,n
c≡ {(viewpi2 (x1, x2, n))},
where x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and |x1| = |x2| = n.
4.2 Secret Sharing based Matrix Multiplication
Secure matrix multiplication is the key to SeSoRec. There are sev-
eral approaches for secure matrix multiplication, such as homomor-
phic encryption [12, 33, 8] and the secret sharing scheme [6], among
which secret sharing is much more efficient. Existing secret shar-
ing based matrix multiplication [6] either needs a trusted Initializer
(a trusted third party) or expensive cryptographic primitives [15] to
generate randomness before computation, i.e., Beavers pre-computed
multiplication triplet [1]. We call it Trusted Initializer based Secure
Matrix Multiplication (TISMM), which may not be applicable in
reality. Besides, TISMM needs to generate many random matrices,
causing efficiency concerns.
In this paper, we propose a novel protocol for secure and efficient
matrix multiplication using secret sharing. Suppose two parties A
and B hold matrix P ∈ Rx×y and matrix Q ∈ Ry×z separately,
where y is an even number8. Our algorithm generalizes the inner
product algorithm proposed in [37] to compute the matrix product
PQ. We first summarize our proposed Secret Sharing based Matrix
Multiplication (SSMM) in Algorithm 2, and then prove its correctness
and security.
4.3 Correctness Proof
According to Algorithm 2, we have
M + N = (P + 2P′)Q1 + (P2 + P
′
o)Q2
+P1(2Q−Q′)− P2(Q2 + Q′e)
= PQ1 + 2P
′Q1 + P2Q2 + P
′
oQ2
+2P1Q− P1Q′ − P2Q2 − P2Q′e (7)
= PQ′ − PQ + 2P′Q′ − 2P′Q
+P′oQ′e − P′oQ′o + 2PQ + 2P′Q
−PQ′ − P′Q′ − P′eQ′e − P′oQ′e (8)
= PQ + P′Q′ − P′oQ′o − P′eQ′e (9)
= PQ. (10)
Equation (8) is by substituting P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 in Equation (7)
according to Algorithm 2 (Line 4 and Line 5). Equation (9) holds
by simplifying Equation (8). The (i, j)-th entry of P′Q′ is the inner
product of the i-th row of P′ and the jth column of Q′. Finally, by
matrix definition, the (i, j)-th entry of P′oQ′o (resp. P
′
eQ′e) is the inner
product of the odd (resp. even) terms in the i-th row of P′ and the
odd (resp. even) terms in the j-th column of Q′, so we have P′Q′ =
P′oQ′o + P
′
eQ′e and the last three terms in Line 4 are cancelled. Thus,
the correctness is proved.
4.4 Security Proof
Theorem 1 Protocol of SSMM (Algorithm 2) computes matrix mul-
tiplication with information leakage Qe − Qo to A and information
leakage Pe + Po to B.
We first give some intuitive discussions on the information disclo-
sure of Algorithm 2. Let Pe and Po be sub-matrices of P constructed
by its even columns and odd columns. Similarly let Qe and Qo be
sub-matrices of Q constructed by its even and odd rows. As indi-
cated in line 4 of Algorithm 2, B has P1, P2 from A. By extracting
8 One can simply change y to an even number by adding an additional zero
column in P and zero row in Q
Algorithm 2: Secret Sharing based Matrix Multiplication (SSMM)
Input: A private matrix P ∈ Rx×y for A, and a private matrix
Q ∈ Ry×z for B
Output: A matrix M ∈ Rx×z for A, and a matrix N ∈ Rx×z
for B, such that M + N = PQ
1 A and B locally generate random matrices P′ ∈ Rx×y and
Q′ ∈ Ry×z
2 A locally extracts even columns and odd columns from P′, and
get P′e ∈ Rx×
y
2 and P′o ∈ Rx×
y
2
3 B locally extracts even rows and odd rows from Q′, and get
Q′e ∈ R
y
2
×z and Q′o ∈ R
y
2
×z
4 A computes P1 = P + P′ and P2 = P′e + P′o, and sends P1 and
P2 to B
5 B computes Q1 = Q′ −Q and Q2 = Q′e −Q′o, and sends Q1
and Q2 to A
6 A locally computes M = (P + 2P′)Q1 + (P2 + P′o)Q2
7 B locally computes N = P1(2Q−Q′)− P2(Q2 + Q′e)
8 B sends N to A, and A calculates M + N
9 return M + N for A
the even column sub-matrix P1e and odd column sub-matrix P1o of
P1, B can calculate P3 = P1e + P1o. Since P1 = P + P′, we have
P1e = Pe + P′e,P1o = Po + P′o. Thus, B can compute Pe + Po
by subtracting P2 from P3. Similar arguments will show that A can
compute Qe −Qo as partial information obtained from B. Although
A and B both have some level of information disclosed as discussed
above, their own private data are still unrevealed.
We then rigorously prove the security level of SSMM, using the
preliminary techniques we have given above. Note that we first as-
sume all the matrices are finite field (Z2` ), and then apply fixed point
decimal arithmetics. Without loss of generality, we first let A be the
adversary and quantify the information leakage to B. The view of A
in real world contains all information of matrices P and P′ (includ-
ing their even and odd column sub-matrices), together with Q1 and
Q2. The key point of the proof is to construct a simulator which can
reproduce the same distribution of Q1 and Q2. The simulator SA for
A’s view proceeds like this:
1. Assume SA has Qe −Qo as prior knowledge;
2. SA generate random matrix Q? ∈ Ry×z;
3. SA Calculate Q?2 = (Q?e −Q?o)− (Qe −Qo).
Q?e and Q
?
o are similarly defined as the even column and odd column
sub-matrices of Q?. We claim that (Q?,Q?2) has the same distribu-
tion as (Q1,Q2), thus being computationally indistinguishable. To
see this, we first notice that Q1 is the difference between a random
matrix Q′ and a fixed matrix Q, which is equally distributed as a
random matrix, say Q?. With this in mind, it can be seen similarly
that Q?e − Qe is equally distributed as Q′e and Q?o − Qo is equally
distributed as Q′o. Therefore, Q
?
2 is equally distributed as Q2. More-
over, SA can reproduce all information of matrices P and P′. So with
additional information of Qe − Qo, the ideal world simulator SA
successfully reconstructs the view of A, which is equivalent to say
that in the real world, only partial information Qe − Qo has been
disclosed to A after running the protocol.
Similar simulator SB can be constructed when assuming B as the
adversary. This completes the security proof.
Complexity Analysis of SSMM. The computational complexity
mainly comes from Line 6 and 7 in Algorithm 2, which is O(x ×
y × z). The communication complexity from A to B depends on
matrices P1 and P2, both of which are O(x × y). The communica-
tion complexity from B to A depends on matrices Q1, Q2, and N,
which are O(y × z), O(y × z), and O(x × z), respectively, and
O((x+ y)× z) in total.
When one of the matrices is sparse, we can slightly modify the se-
cret sharing strategy in Algorithm 2 such that both the computational
and communication complexities are reduced accordingly. Without
loss of generality, we assume Q is sparse in the sense that for the
rows in Q the average number of non-zero entries is d  z. When
generating Q′, B does not make it so dense as in Line 1 of Algorithm
2. The new strategy for generating Q′ is as follows:
for each row in Q do
1. generate random numbers for all non-zero entries
2. randomly select d′  z entries from the zero entries and generate
random numbers for these entries
end
The value d′ is the selected number of non-zero entries of all rows
in Q, and the above new strategy makes d′ small in order to guarantee
that the secret shares fromB toA are sparse. However, as d′ becomes
smaller, A would obtain more information on Q. An extremal case
is d′ = 0, in which A can infer the overall sparsity of Q. Therefore,
a reasonable way is to choose d′ = O(d). Note that, in practice, one
should keep its strategies of choosing d′ (i.e., the ratio of d′/d for
each row) privately in case of information leakage. As long as Q is
sparse, Q1 and Q2 are both sparse and can be calculated when gen-
erating Q′. The computational complexity for matrix multiplication
decreases toO(x×y×d) , and the communication complexity from
B toA decreases toO(x×z+y×d), and thus they are significantly
reduced compared to the general case analysis.
We remark that the above new secret sharing strategy for sparse
matrix exactly satisfy our requirement in SeSoRec. Usually the so-
cial matrix S is sparse. When the user social platform B shares its
secrets, it can use the above new strategy to generate its secret shares.
Moreover, the choice of d′ can be private to B only so that the user-
item interaction platform A cannot gain more information based on
the shares from B.
5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the time complexity of SeSoRec and
discuss its usage and information leakage.
5.1 Complexity Analysis of SeSoRec
We first analyze the communication and computation complexities of
SeSoRec, as shown in Algorithms 1. Recall that I is user number,
|UB| and |VB| denote the user and item numbers in the current mini-
batch respectively, K denotes the dimension of latent factor, and |R|
is the number of ratings (data zise).
Communication Complexity. The communications come from the
calculations of UBDTB , USTB , and UBETB using SSMM. First, for UBDTB
and UBETB , by refering to the complexity analysis of the modified
SSMM, their communication costs are both O(|UB| × |UB|) for each
minibatch, and are both O(|R|/|B| × |UB| × |UB|) ≤ O(|R| × |B|)
for passing the dataset once. Seconed, for USTB , the communication
of U only needs to be done once for each data pass, and therefore, its
communication cost is O(I ×K). To this end, the total communica-
tion costs are O(|R| × |B|) + O(I × K) for passing dataset once.
Since, |B|  |R| and K  I < |R|, the total communication cost
is linear with data size.
Computation Complexity. Suppose the average number of neigh-
bors for each user on platform B is |N |. The time complexity of lines
6 and 7 in Algorithm 2 is O(|UB| × |N | × K) for each minibatch,
and is O(|R|/|B| × |UB| × |N | × K) ≤ O(|R| × |N | × K) for
passing the dataset once. Similarly, the time complexity of the lines
3 and 4 in Algorithm 1 for passing the dataset once is O(|R|/|B| ×
|UB| × |VB| ×K) ≤ O(|R| × |B| ×K). Since |N |, |B|,K  |R|,
the total computation cost is also linear with data size.
By applying minibatch gradient descent, the communication and
computation complexities of SeSoRec are both linear with data size
and thus can scale to large dataset.
5.2 Discussion
Secure common user identification. Our proposed SeSoRec as-
sumes that platforms A and B have the same user set in common,
so that they can proceed SSMM. The essence of secure common user
identification is private set intersection (PSI). Existing work [28] has
provided efficient solution. PSI can be applied to identify common
users on two platforms privately before adopting SeSoRec in prac-
tice, which guarantees that nothing reveals but the IDs of common
users.
Information leakage. SeSoRec is asymmetric for two parties, that
is, the rating platform A and the social platform B collaboratively
conduct SSMM and return the results toA. Therefore, B reveals more
information to A. Although we have proven its security, it may still
cause information leakage of B when A maliciously initiate SSMM
iteratively. Suppose A and B calculate PQ using SSMM, A can infer
Q by varying P and fixing Q and doing this procedure with enough
rounds. A naive solution is to set a constraint on Q when conducting
SSMM. As long as Q (users in each minibatch) is different in each
iteration, SeSoRec will have no information leakage. We leave bet-
ter solutions of this as a future work. Moreover, when one matrix is
sparse in SSMM and the strategies of choosing d′ are exposed, the
social platform B may leak some social information to A. Specifi-
cally, under this circumstance, the sparsity of the social matrix on B
is leaked to A, however the specific social values are still protected.
Therefore, it is crucial that B keeps its selection of d′ for each row of
the social matrix privately.
6 Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments to answer the following
question. Q1: how does SeSoRec perform comparing with the clas-
sic matrix factorization and unsecure social recommendation models,
Q2: what is the performance of SSMM comparing with the existing
TISMM, and Q3: how does the social parameter (λ) affect our model
performance.
6.1 Setting
We first describe the datasets, metrics, and comparison methods we
use in experiments.
Datasets. We use three public real-world datasets, i.e., Epinions [20],
FilmTrust [11] and Douban Movie [36]. All these datasets contain
user-item ratings and user social (trust) information, and are widely
adopted in literature. Note that although rating and social informa-
tion are both available in these datasets, we realistically assume that
they are located on separate platforms without any possibility of data
sharing, which has no side-effect on experiments.
Table 1. Dataset statistics. Assuming that rating information exist onA and
social information are available on B.
Dataset #user #item #rating(A) #social(B)
Epinions 8,619 5,539 229,920 232,461
FilmTrust 1,508 2,071 35,497 1,853
Douban 13,530 13,363 2,530,594 264,811
Since the original rating matrices of Epinions and Douban are too
sparse, we filter out the users and items whose interactions are less
than 20. Table 1 shows the statistics of these datasets after prepro-
cessing, with which we use five-fold cross validation method to con-
duct experiments and evaluate model performance. That is, we split
the dataset into five parts, and each time we use four parts as the
training set and take the last part as test set.
Metrics. To evaluate model performance, we adopt two types of met-
rics, Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Normalized Discounted
Cumulative Gain (NDCG@n), both of which are popularly used to
evaluate factorization based recommendation performance in litera-
ture [16, 13]. RMSE is defined as
RMSE =
√
1
|τ |
∑
(i,j)∈τ
(rij − rˆij)2,
where rˆij is the predicted rating of user i on item j, and |τ | is the
number of predictions in the test dataset τ . RMSE evaluates the er-
ror between real ratings and predicted ratings, with smaller values
indicating better performance. NDCG@n is defined as
NDCG@n = Zn
n∑
n′=1
2r
′
n − 1
log2(n′ + 1)
,
where Zn is a normalizer to ensure that the perfect ranking has value
1 and r′n is the relevance (real ratings) of item at position n′. NDCG
evaluates the ranking performance of recommendation models, with
larger values being better. We report NDCG@10 in experiments, and
abbreviate it as NDCG.
Comparison methods. Our proposed SeSoRec is a novel secure
social recommendation model, which is a secure version of Soreg
[19]. We compare SeSoRecwith the following latent factor models:
• MF [24] is a classic latent factor model, which only uses the user-
item interaction information on platform A. This is the situation
where the social platform B is reluctant to share raw social infor-
mation with the rating platform A.
• Soreg [19] is a classic social recommendation model, which is
unsecure in the sense that A needs the raw data of B.
Note that we do not compare with the state-of-the-art recommen-
dation methods. The reason is: (1) most of them assume the recom-
mendation platform has many different kinds of information such as
contextual information [29], which are unfair for our method to com-
pare with, and (2) our focus is to study the difference between tra-
ditional unsecure social recommendation models and our proposed
secure social recommendation model.
Hyper-parameters. We set the latent factor dimension K = 10,
batch size |B| = 64, and vary regularizer λ and learning rate θ to
choose their best values. We also vary γ in {10−2, 10−1, 100, 101}
to study its effects on SeSoRec. For other parameters, e.g., regular-
izer λ and learning rate θ, we use grid search to find their best values
of each model.
Table 2. Performance comparison on three dataset, including RMSE and
NDCG.
Dataset Metrics MF Soreg SeSoRec
Epinions RMSE 1.2687 1.1791 1.1789NDCG 0.0363 0.0405 0.0401
FilmTrust RMSE 1.1907 1.1754 1.1752NDCG 0.2042 0.2128 0.2124
Douban RMSE 0.7489 0.7420 0.7419NDCG 0.0749 0.0780 0.0778
Table 3. Running time comparison of SSMM and TISMM.
dimension (h) 100 1000 10000
SSMM 0.0025 0.3246 40.744
TISMM 0.0060 0.7279 105.83
6.2 Comparison Results (To Q1)
We report the comparison results on three datasets in Table 2. From
it, we can observe that: (1) Soreg and SeSoRec consistently out-
perform MF. Moreover, we find that the sparser the dataset is, the
more Soreg and SeSoRec improve MF. Take RMSE for example,
SeSoRec improves MF at 7.60%, 1.3%, and 0.98% on Epinions,
FilmTrust, and Douban, with their rating densities 0.48%, 1.14%,
and 1.4%, respectively. The results prove that social information is
indeed important to recommendation performance, especially when
data is sparse. (2) Soreg and SeSoRec achieve almost the same rec-
ommendation accuracy, where the differences come from the fixed
point decimal numbers in secret sharing. The result further validates
the correctness of our proposed SSMM besides the theoretical proof.
6.3 Comparison between SSMM and TISMM (To
Q2)
As we described in SSMM section, existing Trusted Initializer based
Secure Matrix Multiplication (TISMM) [6] needs a trusted initializer
(a trusted third party) to generate secrets before computation. Al-
though TISMM may not be applicable in practice, we would like to
compare the efficiency of our proposed SSMM with it. To this end, we
randomly generate two square matrices P ∈ Rh×h and Q ∈ Rh×h,
where h is the dimension of the square matrix. We then report the
running time (in seconds) of calculating PQ using both algorithms in
Table 3, where we use local area network. It can be easily seen that
our proposed SSMM costs much less time than TISMM. The speedup
is around 2.4 times on average. This is because TISMM needs to
generate more random matrices and involve more matrix operations.
Moreover, our proposed SSMM protocol does not rely on the trusted
initializer which may be difficult to find in practice, thus is more
practical.
6.4 Parameter Analysis (To Q3)
Finally, we study the effect of social regularizer parameter γ on
SeSoRec. Social recommendation can be formalized as a basic fac-
torization model plus a social information model. The social regu-
larizer parameter γ controls the contribution of social information
model to the final model performance. The larger γ is, the more likely
that the latent factors of connected users are similar, and therefore the
more social information model will contribute to the overall perfor-
mance. Figure 1 shows its effects on FilmTrust dataset in terms of
both RMSE and NDCG@10. It can be seen that with a good choice
of γ, SeSoRec can balance the contribution of user-item rating data
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Figure 1. Effect of γ on FilmTrust dataset.
on platform A and user social data on platform B, and thus, achieve
the best performance.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a secret sharing based secure social rec-
ommendation framework, which can not only mine knowledge from
social platform to improve the recommendation performance of the
rating platform, but also keep the raw data of both platforms securely.
Specifically, we first formalized secure social recommendation as
a MPC problem and proposed a SEcure SOcial RECommendation
(SeSoRec) framework for it. We then proposed a novel Secret
Sharing based Matrix Multiplication (SSMM) algorithm to optimize
it, and proved its correctness and security. Besides, we analyzed
that SeSoRec has linear communication and computation complex-
ities and thus can scale to large datasets. Experimental results on
real-world datasets demonstrated that, SeSoRec achieves almost
the same accuracy as the existing unsecure social recommendation
model, and SSMM significantly outperforms the existing trusted ini-
tializer based secure matrix multiplication protocol. In the future,
we would like to solve the potential information leakage problem
of SeSoRec with better solutions.
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